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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Karie T. Cooke appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. On appeal he argues the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The district court set forth the relevant facts, as follows: 
On April 7, 2013, at approximately 7:44 p.m., Idaho State 
Police Trooper Don Moore observed a red Toyota pickup truck 
traveling eastbound on Sagle Road, approaching Lignite Road, with 
insufficient mud flaps in violation of Idaho Code § 49-949. Moore 
conducted a traffic stop. The driver showed an identification card, 
which identified him as the defendant, Karie T. Cooke. Moore 
observed that Cooke appeared nervous and was shaking. When 
asked if he had a valid driver's license, Cooke stated that his 
license was suspended, but the suspension dates had passed. 
Upon performing a check of his driver's license status, dispatch 
advised Moore that Cooke's license was suspended for driving 
under the influence, with suspension dates of 05/27/2011 to 
08/25/2011 and 7/01/2011 to 09/29/2011. Cooke was arrested for 
driving without privileges. Moore searched Cooke's person incident 
to arrest and found six pills inside two small Ziploc baggies in his 
right front pants pocket. After being advised of his Miranda rights, 
Cooke admitted that the pills were morphine and he did not have a 
prescription. Cooke was transported to the county jail where he 
was cited and booked for misdemeanor driving without privileges 
and felony possession of a controlled substance. 
(R., pp.122-23.) 
The state charged Cooke with unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance (morphine). (R., pp.60-61, 67-68, 78-79, 83-84.) Cooke moved to 
suppress the evidence against him, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful 
detention. (R., pp.94-111.) Specifically, he argued the mud flaps on his vehicle 
1 
complied with the requirements of I.C. § 49-949 and, therefore, the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop him. (Id.; see also, R., pp.123-24.) After a hearing, 
the district court denied Cooke's motion. (R., pp.119-129; 9/17/13 Tr., pp.5-39.) 
Cooke entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the 
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.130-44; 10/31/13 Tr., pp.5-10.) The 
district court accepted Cooke's guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction, 
from which Cooke timely appealed. (R., pp.149-56, 161-63.) 
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ISSUE 
Cooke states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cooke's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Cooke failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cooke Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Cooke challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did 
below that "his detention was illegal because [the mud flaps on] his vehicle 
[were] in compliance with Idaho Code section 49-949." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
6.) "Mindful of the fact" that the statutory provisions on which he relies to support 
his argument do not actually apply to his vehicle, Cooke nevertheless "maintains 
that the mud flaps on his truck" complied with I.C. § 49-949 "and, therefore, 
Trooper Moore did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-6.) Cooke's argument fails. The district court correctly applied the 
law to the undisputed facts in concluding the mud flaps on Cooke's vehicle did 
not comply with either the height or width requirements of I.C. § 49-949 and, 
therefore, the stop was lawful. Cook has failed to show error in the denial of his 
motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying 
Cooke's Motion To Suppress 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 121 O; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Trooper Moore stopped Cooke because the mud flaps on his truck did not 
comply with either the height or width requirements of I.C. § 49-949. (R., pp.122-
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23; 9/17/13 Tr., p.7, L.11 - p.8, L.13.) Interpreting that statute, the district court 
found that the language of I.C. § 49-949(1)(a) unambiguously requires all trucks 
equipped with a body to have covers or mud flaps as wide as the tire width and 
not more than 10 inches from the ground. (R., pp.124-27.) Because Cooke's 
vehicle was a "pickup truck by definition, and was equipped with a body," the 
court concluded it was required to have covers or mud flaps that met the height 
and width requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a). (R., p.127.) Because the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that the mud flaps on 
Cooke's vehicle "only covered about half the width of the tire" and "did not extend 
to 10 inches above the surface of the highway," the court upheld the stop as 
being justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Cooke violated I.C. § 
49-949. (R., pp.127-28.) 
On appeal, Cooke does not challenge any of the district court's factual 
findings. Nor does he seriously argue that the district court erred in its 
interpretation of the law. Instead, he merely reiterates the arguments that were 
made to and rejected by the district court, all the while "mindful" that his vehicle 
was a pickup truck, to which the provisions of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a) apply. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) Cooke's arguments fail for all of the reasons set forth 
in the district court's well-written and well-reasoned Memorandum Decision And 
Order re: Defendant's Motion To Suppress, which the state adopts as its 
argument on appeal. (R., pp.122-29 (attached hereto as Appendix A).) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon Cooke's conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. 
DATED this 1ih day of December 2014. 
J) 
Deputy Attorney Genera 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1ih day of December 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RI A. FLEMING 
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vs. 












CASE NO. CR-2013-0001527 
CR-2013-0001528 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Because the defendant's vehicle is a pickup truck by definition and failed 
to meet the requirements ofldaho Code§ 49-949(1)(a), the officer had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to make the stop and the stop was lawful. Therefore, the 
motion to suppress is denied. 
TIIlS MATTER came before the Court on September 17, 2013, for a hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, which was filed on July 12, 2013. Defendant Karie T. Cooke is 
represented by Bonner County Public Defender Janet K. Whitney. The State of Idaho is 
represented by Bonner County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Shane Greenbank. 
I. FACTS 
On April 7, 2013, at approximately 7:44 p.m., Idaho State Police Trooper Don Moore 
observed a red Toyota pickup truck traveling eastbound on Sagle Road, approaching Lignite 
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- -Road, with insufficient mud flaps in violation of Idaho Code § 49-949. Moore conducted a 
traffic stop. The driver showed an Idaho identification card, which identified him as the 
defendant, Karie T. Cooke. Moore observed that Cooke appeared nervous and was shaking. 
When asked if he had a valid driver's license, Cooke stated that his license was suspended, but 
the suspension dates had passed. Upon performing a check of his driver's license status, dispatch 
advised Moore that Cooke's license was suspended for driving under the influence, with 
suspension dates of 05/27/2011 to 08/25/2011 and 07/01/2011 to 09/29/2011. Cooke was 
arrested for driving without privileges. Moore searched Cooke's person incident to arrest and 
found six pills inside two small Ziploc baggies in his right front pants pocket. After being 
advised of his Miranda rights, Cooke admitted that the pills were morphine and he did not have a 
prescription. Cooke was transported to the county jail where he was cited and booked for 
misdemeanor driving without privileges and felony possession of a controlled substance. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED 
In his Motion to Suppress, Cooke raises the following issue: 
A. Did Cooke's vehicle violate Idaho Code § 49-949, and if not, did Moore lack 
reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop? 
Cooke argues that his vehicle did not violate Idaho Code § 49-949, because his pickup 
truck had fenders or covers that were constructed as to be capable at all times of arresting and 
deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances that may be picked up and carried by wheels, in 
compliance with Idaho Code § 49-949. Further, his vehicle is a Toyota pickup truck that has a 
factory built bumper fastened directly to the frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation 
requirements, bringing it into compliance with subsection (1) of the statute. Cooke contends, 
therefore, that Moore did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him for a violation 
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- -of Idaho Code § 49-949. Cooke requests that all evidence found as a result of the stop and 
subsequent search of Cooke's vehicle and person be suppressed, because the search violated his 
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
ID. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals set forth the standard of review for a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
fmdings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we freely review the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 
140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306,309 (2004). At a suppression hearing, the power 
to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-
Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 
Idaho 786,789,979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct.App.1999). 
Id at 778, 275 P.3d at 4. (Emphasis supplied). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Defendant's Vehicle Was Required to Comply with Idaho Code§ 49-949(1)(a). 
Idaho Code § 49-949, which sets forth the requirement as to fenders or covers over all 
wheels on motor vehicles, provides: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or move or any owner to permit 
to be operated or moved, any motor vehlcle, truck, bus, semitrailer or trailer, upon 
any highway without having the vehicle equipped with fenders or covers which 
may include flaps or splash aprons, over and to the rear of wheels, as follows: 
(a) On the rear wheels of every truck equipped with a body, bus, trailer or 
semitrailer the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from a point above and 
forward of the center of the tires over and to the rear of the wheels to a point that 
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- -is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the highway when the 
vehicle is empty; 
(b) Behind the rear wheels of every truck not equipped with a body the fenders 
or covers shall ex.tend downward in full width from a point not lower than 
halfway between the center of the wheels and the top of the tires on the wheels to 
a point that is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the highway 
when the vehicle is empty; 
( c) Behind all wheels of every motor vehicle other than trucks, buses, 
semitrailers, or trailers, the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from a 
point above and forward of the center of the tire over and to the rear of the wheel 
to a point that is not more than twenty (20) inches above the surface of the 
highway, unless the bumper is a factory built bumper fastened directly to the 
frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation requirements; 
(d) Fenders or covers are not required on any modified American-made pre-1935 
vehicle, or any identifiable vintage or replica thereof that is titled as a later 
assembled vehicle or replica and is used for show and pleasure use when such 
vehicle is used and driven only during fair weather on well-maintained hard-
surfaced roads. 
(2) Fenders or covers, as used in subsection (1) of this section, shall be deemed to 
be of sufficient size and construction as to comply with those requirements if 
constructed as follows: 
(a) When measured on the cross sections of the tread of the wheel or on the 
combined cross sections of the treads of multiple wheels, the fender or cover 
extends at least to each side of the width of the tire or of the combined width of 
the multiple tires, as the case may be; 
(b) The fender or cover is constructed as to be capable at all times of arresting and 
deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substance as may be picked up and carried by 
wheels; 
(c) For school buses if the body extension behind the rear wheels exceeds :five (5) 
feet. 
LC. § 49-949. (Emphasis supplied). 
Idaho Code § 49-949 sets out four categories of vehicles to which its requirements apply: 
(1) trucks equipped with a body, (2) trucks not equipped with a body, (3) every motor vehicle 
other than trucks, and (4) any modified American-made pre-1935 vehicle, or any identifiable 
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- -vintage or replica thereof. Cooke argues that his truck should fall under subsection (1 )( c) of the 
statute, which allows an exception to the mud flap requirement for vehicles "other than trucks." 
However, Cooke's argument ignores the plain language of subsection (l)(c) that excepts trucks 
from that subsection. 
The Court finds that the language of Idaho Code § 49-949 is unambiguous. Subsection 
( 1 )( a) of the statute applies to pickup trucks; subsection (1 )( c) does not. Subsection (1 )( c) 
expressly states that it applies to "every motor vehicle other than trucks ... " LC. § 49-949(c). 
"Truck" is defined in Idaho Code§ 49-121(10), as follows: 
"Truck" means: 
(a) Refuse/sanitation. Any vehicle designed and used solely for the purpose of 
transporting refuse. 
(b) General. Every motor vehicle exceeding eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross 
weight designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. 
(c) Pickup truck. Every motor vehicle eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross 
weight or less which is designed, used or maintained primarily for the 
transportation of property. 
(d) Truck camper. A portable unit constructed to provide temporary living 
quarters for recreational, travel or camping use, consisting of a roof, floor, and 
sides, designed to be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pickup truck, 
and containing at least one (1) of the following facilities: stove; refrigerator or 
icebox; self-contained toilet; heater or air conditioner; potable water supply 
including a faucet and sink; separate 110-125 volt electrical power supply; or LP-
gas supply. Truck campers originally constructed with an overall length of six (6) 
feet or longer shall be titled as provided in chapter 5 of this title 49. A truck 
camper does not include pickup hoods, shells or canopies. 
(e) Truck tractor. Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing 
other vehicles but not so constructed as to carry a load other than a part of the 
weight of the vehicle and load so drawn. 
LC.§ 49-121(10). (Emphasis supplied). 
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Cooke's vehicle is a pickup truck by definition, and was equipped with a body. Thus, it 
must meet the requirements of Idaho Code§ 49-949(1)(a) and must have covers or mud flaps as 
wide as the tire width and not more than 10 inches from the ground. Subsection (l)(c) of the 
statute is unambiguous in its application to "every motor vehicle other than trucks," and 
therefore, has no application to this case involving a truck. 
Additionally, Cooke argues that his vehicle did not violate Idaho Code § 49-949 because 
his pickup truck was equipped with fenders that were "constructed as to be capable at all times of 
arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances that may be picked up and carried 
by wheels," in compliance with Idaho Code § 49-949(2)(b). Cooke asserts that "[s]ubsection (2) 
sets out specifications that would render the fenders or covers in compliance with subsection 
(1)." Brie/in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress (August 13, 2013), at p. 6. 
The testimony at the suppression hearing, and the photographs of Cooke's truck admitted 
into evidence at the hearing, show that the pickup has black plastic fenders around the wheel 
wells. The defense presented nothing to establish that the fenders were "constructed as to be 
capable at all times of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances that may be 
picked up and carried by wheels." Apparently, the defense contends that if a vehicle has any type 
of fenders or covers, it is in compliance with the statute. The defense presented no legal 
authority showing that subsection (2) of the statute supersedes subsection (1 ). Therefore, this 
Court will not make a finding that Cooke's vehicle complied with Idaho Code § 49-949 simply 
because it was equipped with fenders. 
B. Trooper Moore Possessed Reasonable Articulable Suspicion For The Stop. 
In State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
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- -Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Henage, 
143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). Limited investigatory detentions 
are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable suspicion 
must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that 
can be drawn from those facts." Id. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a 
mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id (quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). 
The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances 
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Id 
Id. at---, 294 P.3d at 1124. (Emphasis supplied). 
Trooper Moore testified at the suppression hearing that he saw a red truck driving in front 
of his patrol car and observed that the truck bed was near the top of the tires and that most of the 
rear tires were exposed. As the truck slowed for a railroad crossing and Moore got closer, Moore 
observed that the truck did have mud flaps, but that they only covered about half the width of the 
tire. He also observed that they did not extend to 10 inches above the surface of the highway. 
Upon consideration of Moore's statements in his Affidavit in Support of a Warrantless 
Arrest, filed on April 8, 2013, together with the briefs of the parties and the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing, including the testimony of Moore and the photographs of the pickup 
truck during the stop, this Court finds, based on the totality of circumstances known to the officer 
at or before the time of the stop, that Moore had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the 
stop. Therefore, the stop was lawful. 
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
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